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Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a growing disillusionment with the lack of 
national and international regulation of private military and security services. 
While the expansion of the industry after the end of the Cold War has led to 
an increasing number of incidents – such as private soldiers accused of 
shooting at civilians on the streets of Baghdad,1 torturing prisoners in Abu 
Ghraib,2 trying to overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea,3 training 
the Croatian army which committed human rights atrocities in the Krajina,4 
and circumventing the arms embargo against Sierra Leone5 – only the United 
States and South Africa currently have separate laws concerning the export 
of private military and security services. Moreover, regional and interna-
tional efforts such as the United Nations and African Union conventions on 
mercenaries have proven ineffective. 
This chapter seeks to show that the extent to which private military 
and security services are currently controlled by national and international 
regulation, and the options for strengthening existing legislation have been 
very much underestimated. In particular, in Europe there has been an expan-
sion of national and international regulation since the mid-1990s which also 
controls some aspects of the provision and export of private military and 
security services. The emergence of European controls is particularly impor-
tant because a growing section of the private military and security industry is 
not only based in Europe, but also employed by European governments in 
international interventions. Moreover, through the development of best prac-
tices and through the active promotion of European standards such as the 
European Union (EU) Code of Conduct within international organisations 
and allied nations, the EU is contributing to improving the global govern-
ance of the private military and security industry. 
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This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part seeks to explain 
why the role of the EU in the regulation of private military and security ser-
vices has so far been neglected. The second part investigates the growing 
range of EU policies which seek to control the provision and export of mili-
tary and security services. The third part examines how these have comple-
mented and influenced national regulations among the member states. The 
fourth part identifies existing loopholes in the current legislation and what 
steps could be taken to address these. The chapter concludes by arguing that 
the approach of regional harmonisation and strengthening of military service 
export controls embraced by the EU is likely to be supported by both gov-
ernments and industry.  
Security Governance: The EU and the Regulation of PSCs 
One reason for the lack of attention paid to the EU with regard to the regula-
tion of private military and security services has been the state-centric mod-
els with which many authors have approached the issue. Proceeding from 
Weber’s imperative that the state should hold the monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force, the key question has been how the state can retain or regain 
control over the use of force by private military and security companies. An 
international regime on the control of private military force is generally be-
lieved to be highly unlikely in the light of the failures of both the 1989 
United Nations International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Fi-
nancing and Training of Mercenaries and the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa.6 However, 
in conflict regions or failing states, where private military contractors have 
increasingly been employed, state control is often weak and sometimes non-
existent. 
What the prevailing perspective underestimates is the positive role 
that exporting states in Europe and North America and their regional organi-
sations can play in setting new standards for the regulation of private mili-
tary and security services. Although it is correct that private security and 
military companies can evade stricter national and regional controls by mov-
ing abroad, experience with armaments companies shows that the standards 
and export regulations of exporting nations can significantly influence and 
improve the global level of governance of the defence sector. Moreover, 
since many defence export countries and regions are developed and democ-
ratic, they are much more capable of enforcing controls and standards than 
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the underdeveloped or failing states which tend to import military and secu-
rity services. 
A security governance approach helps to illustrate the range of actors 
who might be involved in regulating the sector. It suggests that centralised 
governmental control over the provision of security has been replaced by 
more fragmented modes of governance in which state and non-state actors, 
including private companies but also regional organisations such as the EU, 
NATO and the OSCE play a growing role.7 The differentiation of govern-
ance can be observed in seven dimensions: geography, function, resources, 
interests, norms, decision-making and policy implementation. In each of 
these dimensions, exclusive governmental control is increasingly replaced by 
a multitude of actors, policies and regulations. In geographical terms, gov-
ernmental legal authority over citizens and companies competes or overlaps 
with that of regional regimes and private regulations. In functional terms, 
many regional security organisations have expanded their remit from de-
fence and deterrence to conflict prevention and non-proliferation. Moreover, 
there can be a spillover effect from some dimensions to the others which can 
contribute to the transformation from centralised modes of government to 
fragmented ones.8 For instance, the fragmentation of resources and security 
expertise among state, private and international organisations has facilitated 
the inclusion of these actors in the security policy decision-making and pol-
icy implementation process. 
The exponential growth in private security and military services can 
be understood as part of this shift from centralised ‘government’ to frag-
mented ‘governance’.9 It is on the one hand a result of the differentiation of 
resources and expertise between the armed forces and private military and 
security companies, and on the other hand it is a factor which contributes to 
the further involvement of private companies in security policy-making and 
implementation.  
However, the security governance approach also suggests the possibil-
ity of controlling private security contractors beyond the state. In particular, 
it argues that the state is not the sole actor capable or even responsible for 
the regulation of private military and security companies. In addition, there 
is scope for the self-regulation of private security firms and for a growing 
role of regional organisations in regulating the private use of force. Most 
importantly, the security governance approach argues that contemporary 
governance can proceed through sets of overlapping standards and regula-
tions at multiple levels including the company, industry, state, region or 
globe which can be mutually reinforcing and frequently create their own 
dynamics contributing to tighter regulations.  
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Diverse standards, codes of practices and legislation can be observed 
across these levels. They include registering and licensing of companies 
providing private security and military services as well as the provision and 
export of these services themselves. The relevant companies include special-
ised military service firms, domestic private security and guarding compa-
nies, risk consultancies and armaments corporations; the services can range 
from combat, personal security and military training to security consulting, 
technical support for the operation and maintenance of military equipment, 
procurement, trafficking and brokering of military equipment, explosive 
ordnance disposal, logistical support for military operations and bases, intel-
ligence collection and analysis, including the interrogation of military pris-
oners.10  
Given the variety of companies and services that can be subsumed un-
der the private military and security service sector, different regulations, 
laws and standards apply to separate sections of the industry. In Europe, 
such laws and standards include national registration of companies, public 
and private training standards set by governments and industry associations, 
but also a growing number of national and regional EU-wide regulations on 
the export of specific military and security services. 
Just as the differences between the mode of governance in different 
dimensions can lead to pressures for further transformation, the divergences 
and interactions between distinct regulatory approaches and standards in 
Europe have led to demands for greater harmonisation. However, rather than 
limiting standards to the lowest common denominator, as has been the case 
in some environmental regulations,11 controls over the private military and 
security sector have been tightened and expanded. 
The EU has been a key actor in this development because it has been 
at the centre of various overlapping sets of regulations – both in functional 
and geographical terms. Functionally, the EU’s authority ranges from the 
regulation of the private security industry as part of the internal market to the 
potential control of the export of private military and military support ser-
vices under its Common Foreign and Security Policy. Geographically, the 
EU influences the regulatory policies of its member states, but is also in-
volved in representing its members at the United Nations and promoting 
common EU standards, such as the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 
worldwide.  
However, while a system of multilevel governance in which overlap-
ping national and regional regulations strengthen each other appears to have 
major advantages, there are also some disadvantages. The disadvantages 
include the complexity and inconsistency of the emerging controls which 
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currently leave a number of legislative loopholes and which put a heavy 
administrative burden on regulators and private security providers. The fol-
lowing sections examine how these controls have evolved over the past dec-
ade before proceeding to discuss the potential for further improvements. 
European Union Regulations and Policies 
The European Union has played a critical role in promoting national and 
regional regulations on the provision of military and security services in its 
member states and their export to third countries.12 Existing regulations in-
clude the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and a range of Common 
Foreign and Security Policies, either in conjunction with the Code or sepa-
rately, which have created requirements for national laws or imposed limita-
tions on the export of military services such as technical assistance related to 
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and to embargoed destinations, the 
brokering of arms, and the export of small arms and light weapons. In addi-
tion, the EU Court of Justice has formally established EU competence over 
the regulation of domestic security services under the first pillar.13 The fol-
lowing sections examine each policy in detail before turning to national leg-
islation in the member states. 
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
The EU Code of Conduct on Armaments Exports emerged in June 1998 out 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, but through its institutionalisa-
tion has taken an independent role in the promotion of stricter export con-
trols for military equipment and services.14 The Code of Conduct was origi-
nally drawn up to set common standards for conventional arms transfers and 
to facilitate the exchange of information about arms exports among member 
states. The Code of Conduct further called for the circulation among the 
member states of confidential annual reports on their arms exports and the 
implementation of the Code, as well as for the production of a consolidated 
yearly report by the EU. The first report was published in November 1999.15 
It was four pages long and observed the initial efforts to establish institu-
tional channels of communication on arms transfers among the member 
states. Since then the details contained in each report and the scope of the 
Code have increased every year.16 While the fifth report of 2003 was 42 
pages long and included lists of arms export volumes by destinations and 
exporting member states,17 the seventh report of 2005 contained no less than 
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288 pages specifying national exports by country, destination, type of 
equipment and value.18  
Since all member states are required to produce annual national re-
ports as the basis for the consolidated EU report, most members have de-
cided to make their national data on armaments exports public. Today all but 
two of the 25 member states, Cyprus and Greece, publish their national re-
ports online.19 
The impact of the Code of Conduct has not only been to increase 
transparency concerning armaments exports from the EU, the Conventional 
Arms Exports Working Group (COARM) has played an important role in 
identifying additional areas which require regulation and in strengthening 
existing export controls. With regard to private military and security ser-
vices, COARM has specifically contributed to EU regulation on the broker-
ing of arms. COARM first identified the issue of brokering as a problem in 
the annual report on the implementation of the Code in 2000. By 2001, 
member states had agreed on a set of guidelines for controlling brokering as 
the basis for national legislation.20 The result was the Council Common Posi-
tion on the control of arms brokering, passed in June 2003, which has made 
binding the national regulation of brokering among the member states.21 
Armaments Brokering 
The provision for the national regulation of armaments brokering are set out 
in Council Common Position 2003/468/CFSP of June 2003.22 The Common 
Position formally requires member states to implement these guidelines in 
the form of national legislation. The stated objective of the Common Posi-
tion 2003/468/CFSP is ‘to control arms brokering in order to avoid circum-
vention of UN, EU or OSCE embargoes on arms exports, as well as of the 
Criteria set out in the EU Code of Arms Exports’. The Common Position 
mandates that ‘member states will take all necessary measures to control 
brokering activities taking place within their territory’, but it also encourages 
member states ‘to consider controlling brokering activities outside their terri-
tory carried out by brokers of their nationality resident or established in their 
territory’.23  
Technical Assistance Related to WMDs and Embargoed Destinations 
Whereas Common Position 2003/468/CFSP emerged from deliberations 
within the context of the EU Code of Conduct, other defence export control 
issues are discussed under the general provisions of the EU's Common For-
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eign and Security Policy. Specifically, the Council agreed on the need to 
control technical assistance related to weapons of mass destruction. 
The resulting EU Council Joint Action 2000/401 of 22 June 2000 has 
committed member states to the control of technical assistance related to 
certain military end-uses or destinations among the member states.24 The 
proposed regulations concern technical assistance related to items ‘which are 
or may be intended for use in connection with weapons of mass destruction 
or missiles for delivery of such weapons’.25 Technical assistance as defined 
by the EU Joint Action covers nearly the entire spectrum of private military 
and security services, albeit only with regard to WMDs, including ‘technical 
support related to repairs, development, manufacture, assembly, testing, 
maintenance or any other technical service, and may take forms such as in-
struction, training, transmission of working knowledge or skills or consulting 
services’. 
The Joint Action also ‘encourages’ member states to ‘consider the ap-
plication of such controls also in cases where the technical assistance relates 
to military end-uses other than those referred to in Article 2 … and is pro-
vided in countries of destination subject to an arms embargo’. In sum, the 
Council suggests national legislation regarding the export of private military 
services related to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons as well as to any 
country subject to international arms sanctions. 
EU Embargoes on Technical Services 
While Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP suggests that EU member states should 
contemplate a national regulation of the export of technical assistance to 
embargoed destinations, the EU has also directly mandated the licensing or 
prohibition of technical service exports to certain countries in compliance 
with United Nations sanctions. 
Following increasing awareness of the dangers of exporting military 
assistance and services to conflict regions by the United Nations and the 
inclusion of such services in UN sanctions since the mid-1990s, the EU 
Council has imposed collective EU regulations on technical assistance to a 
number of destinations.26 In May 2006, nine individuals, groups and coun-
tries were subject to such export restrictions – the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Myanmar/Burma, Somalia, Sudan, Osama bin 
Laden/Al-Qaida/Taliban, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.27 Previously, similar 
embargoes had been imposed on Afghanistan,28 Ethiopia and Eritrea,29 
Libya,30 Nigeria31 and the former Yugoslavia.32 Importantly for the regula-
tion of PSCs, the EU's definition of ‘technical services’ in most of these 
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embargoes subsumes all types of military, security and military support ser-
vices. The definition is also considerably broader than those embraced in 
many of the national export legislations that emerged from Joint Action 
2000/401/CFSP.  
Small Arms and Light Weapons 
In addition, the EU has adopted common policies regarding the transfer of 
small arms and light weapons, which can be facilitated by the operations of 
PSCs in developing countries.33 In 1998, the Council adopted Joint Action 
1999/34/CFSP on the EU contribution to combating the destabilising accu-
mulation and spread of small arms and light weapons.34 Amongst others, the 
Joint Action envisaged that the EU should enhance efforts to build a consen-
sus in international organisations such as the United Nations and the OSCE 
for restrictive arms export criteria as provided in the EU Code of Conduct. 
Moreover, the Joint Action proposes that member states ‘shall seek to in-
crease the effectiveness of their national actions in the field of small arms’.35  
In 2002, it was replaced by Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP which also 
included the export of ammunition for small arms and light weapons and 
expanded the list of measures sought to counter the spread of small arms.36 
In direct application of the Joint Actions, the Council passed two Decisions 
which offered the government of Cambodia assistance in the development of 
appropriate legislation for the possession, use and sale of small arms and 
ammunition and for general disarmament measures.37 Other projects directed 
at the finding, collection and destruction of small arms were agreed on with 




Finally, the EU is beginning to exert its influence over the regulation of pri-
vate security services among the member states. Specifically, the European 
Court of Justice has established the competence of the EU Commission in 
several rulings according to which private security counts as an ‘economic 
sector’ and as such falls under the first pillar of regulation of the internal 
market.40 However, the movement towards common European regulations 
on private policing has so far been rather slow. A Spanish initiative concern-
ing the establishment of a network of contact points of national authorities 
responsible for private security was rejected by the European Parliament for 
formal reasons.41 Nevertheless, the committee of the European Parliament in 
charge of the issue was in favour of harmonising member states’ regulations 
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of the private security sector and the Council adopted on 13 June 2002 a 
recommendation regarding cooperation between the competent national au-
thorities of member states responsible for the private security sector.42 Fur-
ther pressure for common European regulations is exerted by the Confedera-
tion of European Security Services (CoESS) and the trade union federation 
Uni-Europa which signed on 18 July 2003 a Code of Conduct for the private 
security sector. The sectoral social partners believe ‘that the rules governing 
their sector need to be harmonised across the EU’.43 
National Controls 
The impact of EU policies on national legislation regarding private military 
and security services in the member states has been significant. Current na-
tional regulation applies to six types of military and security services in par-
ticular: technical assistance related to WMDs and embargoed countries, bro-
kering, technical services related to controlled goods, military training and 
domestic security services. The first three sets of regulations are a direct 
consequence of the EU policies outlined above. The last three are the result 
of national policy priorities and export control traditions, specifically among 
the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe which used to have 
strict export controls and were recently required to develop new laws due to 
accession.44 Since a detailed examination of the legislation in all 25 member 
states is beyond the scope of this chapter, the following sections discuss the 
scope and variance of regulation in each of the six areas. 
Technical Assistance Related to WMDs and Embargoed Destinations 
Since Joint Actions are legally binding for EU member states, Joint Action 
2000/401/CFSP on the export of technical assistance related to WMDs has to 
be implemented in the form of national legislation by the member states. As 
of 2006, a majority of members have done so. They include Austria, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lat-
via, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. However, slow legislative processes have delayed 
new legislation on technical assistance as well as embargoed destinations in 
a considerable number of countries. In particular, Belgium, Cyprus, France, 
Ireland, Luxemburg and Malta have not yet or not fully implemented spe-
cific legislation controlling the export of technical assistance related to all 
WMDs and missiles for their delivery.45 
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While Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP requires member states to regulate 
the export of technical assistance related to WMDs and delivery missiles, the 
form of regulation is left to the individual member states. Accordingly, na-
tional legislation within the EU varies considerably. Five countries, namely 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have prohib-
ited the export of related technological assistance, whereas other member 
states request that exporters apply for a licence. 
The variation is even greater with regard to technical assistance for 
embargoed destinations because Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP encourages, 
but does not demand, national legislation on the issue. Whereas Austria and 
Hungary prohibit the export of certain types of technical assistance to all 
countries under an arms embargo, others such as the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia 
and Spain require export licences. Finally, Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom, have decided not to nationally regulate the export of technical 
assistance to countries subject to international sanctions, perhaps because 
prohibitions to export technical services are today already included in most 
United Nations and EU arms embargoes with which member states have to 
comply. 
Brokering 
Three years after Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP, Common Position 
2003/468/CFSP on the brokering of arms has been implemented more 
widely among the member states, although not more consistently.46 National 
licensing requirements exist in 19 EU countries with the exceptions of Cy-
prus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg and Portugal. However, the scope of 
the controls differs considerably among the member states. Some countries 
such as Austria and Denmark regulate brokering activities only when con-
ducted from within their national territories; other countries such as Finland, 
Hungary and Slovakia control brokering also if citizens, permanent residents 
or registered businesses engage in brokering activities abroad. Some national 
laws are very complex and detailed; others are very general leaving much 
open to interpretation. In addition, several countries, including Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain, have set up 
national registers for armaments brokers in which individuals or businesses 
planning to engage in future brokering activities have to be registered prior 
to applying for a licence, whereas most states require only individual export 
licences. 
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Technical Services Related to Controlled Goods 
As a consequence of historically strict export controls and the necessity to 
revise national export legislation in compliance with EU accession in 2004, 
most Central and Eastern European countries have more extensive licensing 
requirements than the older EU member states. In particular the accession 
process has encouraged the new members to draft legislation which subjects 
the export of all types of military equipment and related services to licens-
ing. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slo-
venia and Slovakia thus have comprehensive regulations which typically 
include the services provided in connection with controlled military equip-
ment, such as development, design, production, adjustment, repair, mainte-
nance and use, under the same licensing laws. 
How strict national criteria are for granting a licence is, as in all the 
cases above, a separate question. In principle, the EU Code of Conduct lists 
seven criteria which member states have agreed to take into account when 
granting arms export licences:  
 
1. Respect of human rights in the country of final destination; 
2. The internal situation of the country of final destination; 
3. Preservation of regional peace, security and stability; 
4. The national security of the Member States and of territories whose 
external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as 
that of friendly and allied countries; 
5. The buyer country's behaviour with regard to the international com-
munity, in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances 
and respect for international law; 
6. The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the 
buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions; 
7. The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic 
capacity of the recipient country. 
Military Training 
Due to the explicit linkage of services to controlled military equipment in 
EU Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP, few member states regulate the export of 
military training beyond that in the use of military technology. Thus, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy demand licences for the export of all 
training related to the ‘use’ or ‘handling’ of military equipment; and Estonia 
and Poland regulate the export of training and consulting services related to 
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military goods, including ‘technical support related to the development, 
manufacture, assembly, testing, repairs, transport or maintenance of military 
goods, or any other relevant service’.47 Only Sweden has a separate stipula-
tion on the licensing of all ‘training with a military purpose’.48 
Private Policing 
Whereas the preceding sections have focused on the export of certain types 
of military and security services, a large body of national legislation applies 
to the provision of security services within the territory of the member states. 
Although these regulations do not apply to the transfer of private security 
services overseas, it can be argued that companies which have to meet cer-
tain standards nationally will to some degree export them when operating 
abroad. An overview of national legislation on private security services 
among the 25 EU member states has been produced by CoESS.49 It shows 
that from the 1990s nearly all European countries have stepped up their con-
trol of domestic private security and policing services. 
The prime mechanisms regulating private security and military ser-
vices in the EU member states are the national registration and licensing of 
security companies and their personnel.50 The conditions for a licence, which 
on average needs to be renewed every five years, vary among the member 
states. However, all member states require a clear criminal record among 
management and personnel. Additional conditions include sufficient liability 
insurance, identification cards with name and photo, and approved uniforms 
which are not easily confused with those of the police or armed forces.51  
About 60 percent of the EU member states mandate specific training 
of private security personnel and the passing of an examination.52 Training 
can range from basic instruction of between 32 (France) and 300 hours (Po-
land) to complementary and follow-up training, including for the protection 
of persons, the transport of valuables and the use of firearms. With the ex-
ception of Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK, most member 
states allow for the carrying of firearms by security personnel with a special 
permit. Nevertheless, many states limit and request registration of the type 
and number of weapons concerned, and most mandate that after-hours stor-
age has to be in special facilities.53 
General Level of Controls  
Although the extent to which EU member states are controlling the provision 
or export of private military and security services is larger than commonly 
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recognised, few countries go beyond the requirements currently set by the 
EU Code of Conduct and the Common Policies and Joint Actions outlined in 
the first part of this chapter. As summarised in Table 10.1, the main Euro-
pean arms-exporting states, such as the UK, France, Germany and Italy, do 
not have the most extensive controls. In fact, the largest exporter of military 
and security services, the UK, is one of the member states with the least 
restrictive export regulations. Although the UK has implemented all new EU 
regulations, it has only done so to the required minimum. Other large de-
fence exporters, such as France and Italy, are still in the process of imple-
menting the new EU export control policies with regard to technical assis-
tance or brokering in national laws. 
Among the medium-sized arms exporters, Sweden stands out as the 
member state with the strictest controls, followed by the Netherlands; 
whereas the regulations of Austria and Spain are merely average. The states 
with the most restrictive armaments and military service export regulations 
can be found among the new members, including Poland, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Ironically, 
these countries have been more likely to be importers than exporters of pri-
vate military and security services.54 
Loopholes and Options for Future Regulation 
The preceding analysis has illustrated the range of regulative measures 
which control the domestic provision and international export of private 
military and security services in Europe. Although some organisations such 
as Amnesty International find reason to criticise the implementation of exist-
ing armaments export legislation in Europe,55 it demonstrates that the mem-
ber states of the EU are recognising the importance of regulating not only the 
export of military equipment, but also of related services. In addition, the 
central place of the EU within the evolving security governance structures in 
Europe and pressures for the harmonisation of various standards and legisla-
tions have contributed to the strengthening of controls. Since the new regula-
tions on the control of technical assistance and brokering have only recently 
come into force and only in some member states, it is too early to attempt an 
assessment of the effectiveness of these controls and their implementation. 
Instead, this section will discuss the remaining gaps in the current legislation 
and how the EU might address them. 
 
Elke Krahmann 202

















Austria56 prohibited or licensed 
prohibited or 
licensed licensed — — 
Belgium57 — prohibited or licensed licensed — — 
Cyprus58 — — — — — 
Czech Repub-
lic59 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Denmark60 prohibited — licensed — — 
Estonia61 licensed licensed licensed licensed licensed 
Finland62 prohibited — licensed — — 
France63 C-weapons prohibited — licensed — — 
Germany64 prohibited licensed licensed — — 
Greece65 ? ? — ? ? 
Hungary66 licensed prohibited licensed licensed licensed 
Ireland67 — — — — — 
Italy68 licensed licensed — — licensed 
Latvia69 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Lithuania70 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Luxemburg71 — — — — — 
Malta72 — — licensed — — 
Netherlands licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Poland73 licensed licensed licensed licensed licensed 
Portugal74 ? ? — ? ? 
Slovakia75 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Slovenia76 licensed licensed licensed licensed — 
Spain77 licensed licensed licensed — — 
Sweden78 prohibited — licensed — licensed 
United King-
dom79 prohibited — licensed — — 
Gaps in Current Legislation 
As has been argued in the second part of this chapter, the private military 
and security industry includes a broad variety of providers and services. 
They range from armaments corporations to security guards; and from com-
bat and armed site protection to risk consulting and military training. The 
preceding sections have shown that only a limited section of these providers 
and services are subject to specific legislation. As a result, control over the 
provision and export of private military and security services in the EU has 
two major gaps. 
Regulating Military and Security Services in the European Union 203 
The first gap in the current controls concerns the application of na-
tional licensing and training standards to companies and individuals who are 
registered in one of the member states, but who are providing their services 
in other member states or outside the EU. With regard to the former, the EU 
Court of Justice has ruled that, in the absence of common EU regulations, 
member states have to recognise the national standards of other EU countries 
even if these are lower than their national licensing requirements. Since the 
majority of security companies rely on local and national expertise and repu-
tation for their success, the danger of companies circumventing tight controls 
by moving to those member states with the least controls is limited. Al-
though there is an increasing transnationalisation of larger companies, most 
work through national subsidiaries, which operate under national laws. For 
instance, the world’s second largest private security company, G4S which 
was formed in 2004 by a merger between Group 4 Falck and Securicor, op-
erates globally through a network of subsidiaries registered in over 100 
countries. 
Nevertheless, there has been increasing pressure for a harmonisation 
of national legislation under the authority of the EU, including from security 
industry associations such as CoESS. The industry contends that the current 
differences not only give companies registered in member states with low 
standards a competitive advantage, they also make it difficult for security 
firms to supply transnational security services such as transport security for 
the integrated market of the EU. 
With regard to the operation of security companies outside the EU, 
there has so far been no attempt to enforce national licensing and training 
standards. Although Finland, Hungary and Slovakia have set a precedent for 
the extraneous application of national regulations in the case of arms broker-
ing, most EU member states are reluctant to take responsibility for the for-
eign operations of national companies or citizens. The main argument 
against such legislation is that states do not have the resources to monitor 
compliance with national standards abroad. 
A second gap regards the export of military and security services that 
are not directly linked to military equipment. Unfortunately, these services 
make up a major proportion of the private military and security sector. They 
include armed combat, personnel and site protection, transport security, stra-
tegic and tactical military training, risk analysis, intelligence gathering and 
contingency planning. Even the prohibitions of technical military assistance 
and services to embargoed destinations under the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy rarely subsume these services. Nevertheless, experience 
in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Africa has demonstrated that the provision 
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of strategic and tactical assistance can be as decisive for the outcome of a 
conflict as the export of missiles and tanks. Although embargoed destina-
tions are obviously the main areas of concern with regard to the supply of 
non-technical military assistance, the long-term impact of military training in 
particular should be taken into account when permitting their export to non-
democratic regimes. 
Policy Options 
Several policies suggest themselves to address these gaps and simplify the 
regulation of the private security industry within the EU. With regard to the 
national registration and licensing of companies and individuals, consider-
able progress towards the harmonisation of national laws within the EU has 
been made by the ruling of the EU Court of Justice that security services are 
part of the common internal market. As a consequence, the Commission has 
technical authority over the sector under the first pillar. While the EU Coun-
cil decided to exclude private security services from the Commission’s pro-
posed draft directive on services in the internal market which is likely to 
come into force in 2006, it tasked the Commission with presenting a separate 
proposal for the harmonisation of regulations concerning private security 
services within a year after the implementation of the directive.80  
The most effective solution would be a proposal for common basic 
standards for the registration and licensing of private security providers, 
including vetting, training, safekeeping of weapons and licence renewal. 
Common EU standards could help to raise the level of regulation and lessen 
the administrative burden on both companies and member states. Moreover, 
common regulations would facilitate the spread of EU best practice among 
acceding and aspirant members. 
Concerning the export of military and security services not related to 
military equipment, a number of complementary policies could be envis-
aged. Most effective would be an agreement within the EU Council on a 
CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) Common Position comparable 
to that on brokering activities, which requires member states to implement 
national legislation controlling the export of military and security services. 
Such legislation should apply to all third countries and require the licensing 
of all service exports by the national authorities. Member states would de-
cide what types of services should be controlled and what requirements 
should be made for an export license.  
Alternatively, or to complement the above, the EU Council could ex-
tend the application of the export control criteria endorsed in the EU Code of 
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Conduct on Arms Exports to military and security services. Although the 
Code is less binding than an EU Common Position, it might serve as a first 
step towards the introduction of export controls on military and security 
services. Given the success of the Code’s COARM working group in bring-
ing about legislation on arms brokering, an extension of the Code would 
facilitate broader awareness and discussion of the problems posed by un-
regulated service exports among the EU member states.  
In addition, COARM might want to consider a common list of mili-
tary and security services similar to the EU common list of military equip-
ment established under the EU Code of Conduct to encourage the harmoni-
sation of the military and security service export legislation among the 
member states.81 The list would need to be reviewed regularly to take into 
account new developments in the sector and to establish best practice. In the 
case of further legislation, the EU Code of Conduct could also be used to 
facilitate the exchange of information regarding military and security service 
license denials through the same network that has been set up for notification 
on arms exports among the member states. 
Finally, the EU’s common regulations on the export of dual-use 
equipment, i.e. goods with civilian and military applications, could be ex-
tended to cover technical assistance related to these services. A 2005 study 
on the possible amendment of Council Regulation 1334/2000 on export con-
trol of dual-use items and technologies initiated by the EU Commission has 
already investigated different options for controlling the illicit brokering of 
dual-use items to comply with UN Resolution 1540.82  
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to illustrate the current extent and future 
possibilities for strengthening the national and international regulation of 
private military and security services in the EU and, thus, worldwide. It has 
demonstrated that private security companies are not only subject to exten-
sive standards and regulations within the member states, but that the EU is 
also controlling the export of an increasing range of military and security 
services ranging from technical assistance to support for military activities in 
embargoed destinations. 
What are the consequences of this analysis for the debate over the 
regulation of private military and security services? Most contemporary ef-
forts to control the growing private military sector have aimed towards new, 
preferably global, regimes on mercenaries and private military and security 
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firms. However, in order to function, these regimes not only need the support 
of a sufficient number of signatories, they also require a strong normative 
commitment in the absence of global monitoring mechanisms or effective 
sanctions. As a consequence, progress on a global regime for private military 
services has been limited. 
This chapter suggests that there might be a faster and more effective 
way to improve the regulation of private military and security services. It has 
demonstrated that overlapping national and regional regulations, while not 
perfect, can create a dynamic by which a centrally-placed actor such as the 
EU can exert pressure for harmonisation in favour of more comprehensive 
control mechanisms. This approach appeals to governments because com-
mon controls are more cost-efficient and easier to implement than national 
regulations by simplifying overlapping legislations. However, it is also sup-
ported by the industry because regional regulations eliminate competitive 
disadvantages. 
It might be argued that the example of the EU is not directly transfer-
able to other regional organisations because few have the central decision-
making capacity and authority of the EU. Neverthless, several arguments 
suggest that the evolution of military and security service regulations in 
Europe might still serve as a model. First, the EU Code of Conduct, Com-
mon Position 2003/468/CFSP and Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP were de-
cided intergovernmentally and on the basis of a consensus among the mem-
ber states. High levels of integration are thus not a precondition for common 
regulations. Second, the initial level and scope of EU export controls were 
limited. Rather than trying to achieve a maximum level of control immedi-
ately, member states agreed on a general framework in the form of the Code 
of Conduct which institutionalised cooperation and consultation on the issue 
of armaments export controls. While the original Code was only politically 
binding and very general in its stipulations, it was this institutional network 
which has created a permanent forum for the discussion, and implementa-
tion, of more extensive regulations. Finally, the EU, through enlargement 
and as an international actor in organisations such as the United Nations, 
seeks to increase the number of states which subscribe to the Code and re-
lated regulations. A small number of states who can agree on common regu-
lations for their growing national and international private military service 
industry might thus serve as a core for future regional or pan-regional con-
trols. In conclusion, the EU not only suggests how other regions might be 
able to improve the regulation of private military and security services, it 
also plays an active part in the expansion and export of its controls. 
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